Fees and payouts

1. In brief

2. What it costs to create something

Two things can be created here: a token launch, and a prediction market on one. Both are charged once, at the moment of creation, by a contract rather than by this site. Neither charge is refundable and neither creation can be undone.

2.1 A dollar to create anything

Both creation charges become $1, and the percentage above is deleted. A two-ETH launch and a hundred-ETH launch pay the same figure, and so does a market.

The launch fee is a dollar figure priced into ETH at the moment of the launch, not a wei figure stored anywhere that can go stale. The price comes from one shared oracle: a cached answer posted roughly every fifteen minutes, with a live Chainlink feed behind it for when the cache is stale or missing. If neither can answer, the transaction reverts and names both feeds, when each last answered and the bound each was judged against. A fee that cannot be priced is not guessed at.

The fee is settable, between zero and ten dollars. Zero is a real setting, is how a free-creation promotion is run, and skips the oracle entirely. The $10 ceiling is a constant in the contract and cannot be raised without deploying a new pricing contract. A change reaches launches created after it; it never re-prices a launch that already exists, because the charge happens once and there is nothing afterwards to re-price. A time-limited discount, or a free-creation voucher won on the Fortune Wheel, can lower one creation’s charge down to zero. Neither ever raises it.

2.2 A market creation fee splits four ways

A market’s fee is the same dollar figure, charged in the currency that market settles in and converted at the moment you create the market from that currency’s own price feed — ETH through the same oracle as the launch fee, and every other currency, stablecoins included, through a feed of its own. If that currency has no price, or its price is out of date, the market cannot be created in it until it is priced again. ETH owed must be attached at least; the excess is refunded in the same transaction. A token fee is pulled exactly, and refused if it is above the figure you agreed to. A discount or a free-creation voucher lowers the dollar fee; the two opening stakes stay full size, the platform’s seeder posts the difference, and the Fortune Wheel and protocol shares are shares of what you actually paid.

2.2a Signed markets pay a surge; unsigned ones pay a flat fee

What the two stakes buy is that a market can never end one-sided. Both pools hold something from the market’s first block, so there is always a counterparty: a market settles for real and charges its settlement fee, instead of falling back to refunding everybody at par. The stake on the losing side is absorbed into the pot and paid out to the winners — that is the subsidy this buys, and it is genuinely gone. The stake on the winning side is claimed back by the platform once the market has settled.

2.3 After THD launches, a launch fee is paid in THD

Until THD launches, nothing in this subsection applies and the fee is the one above. A discount applies before the doubling; a free-creation voucher makes either option free. If THD’s price is not available, the THD option is refused and the launch’s own currency is the one that works. A THD fee never counts as platform revenue. Prediction markets always pay in their own currency.

2.4 What creating something does not buy

A creation fee buys creation. It is not a deposit, not a stake, not a position and not refundable if the launch never graduates or the market settles against its creator. It is charged before anything has been raised, which is why the ceiling on it is written into the contract rather than left to a setting.

3. What a trade costs

A round trip on the curve — one buy and one sell — therefore costs about 4% before the price moves at all. Gas is additional. None of these fees is refundable.

A market’s fee is set per currency by the owner and capped at 5% by a constant in the contract that has no setter. Every market snapshots the figure when it is created, so a later change cannot move the terms of a market you are already staked in. A market that bought a featured placement charges that on top, on the same base, and it is snapshotted the same way.

Today a market with nothing staked on one side charges nothing and refunds both sides at par, because there was no counterparty to take a fee from. The opening stakes in section 2 are what would end that: once both pools are non-empty from the first block, every market settles for real and every market pays.

A graduated pool pays its fee in both currencies. The ETH leg splits as section 4 describes. The token leg is burned in full: there is no share to compute and no remainder to assign, and the contract re-reads total supply afterwards to confirm it fell by exactly the amount burned.

4. How the fee splits

The same three shares apply to the curve fee and to the ETH leg of a graduated pool’s swap fee.

The protocol’s share is taken by subtraction, not by a third multiplication: the creator’s share and the promoters’ share are each computed and everything they leave is the protocol’s. Integer division truncates, and doing it this way assigns that truncation exactly once instead of leaving a wei nobody can claim.

These shares are fixed per launch at the moment it is created, and cannot be changed afterwards — not by the creator, not by us.

A launch’s own configuration is readable on chain and is the authority for that launch. The figures above describe launches created under the current fee model. A launch created before it carries the shares that were in force when it was created, and keeps them for the life of the token. Read the launch, not this page, if the two could differ.

5. The KOL allocation window

The promoters’ 40% does not sit with the creator. It accumulates in a contract called KolSplitter, and it becomes spendable only inside a window.

Because the grid is anchored at the launch instant, a creator picks their daily allocation time by picking when they launch. A keeper that opens a window late misses that slot; it never moves the others.

The keeper can only open a window and close an expired one. It supplies no amounts, no recipients and no rates — every figure is read from the contract’s own state and divided there. Closing is permissionless once the six hours are over, so anybody can settle a window and nobody can hold a creator’s money hostage by declining to.

6. How a creator allocates

Inside the window, the creator names KOLs and the share each is to receive. They pay their own gas. The rules:

Fractions cannot be expressed. An allocation of “1.9%” is not rejected — there is no way to write it down. The share is a whole number of percent, so nothing rounds and the contract does the multiplication against a window figure the creator does not have to compute.

Nothing caps the total. A creator may hand out the whole window, none of it, or anything between. The two limits are per KOL — the 1% floor, and that KOL’s rank cap — and the only ceiling on the total is the window itself, counted cumulatively across every call the creator makes inside it.

Allocating less is how a creator keeps more. Whatever is left when the window closes lapses, and splits 50/50 between the creator and the platform. An odd wei goes to the creator: the halves are taken by subtraction rather than by two divisions, so no wei is paid twice and none is stranded.

That remainder is a consequence of the creator’s own choice and not a floor anyone is promised. A creator who allocates the whole window leaves nothing to split, and a KOL should not read the 50/50 as money held back for them.

7. Rank caps

A KOL’s rank limits how much of one window they may be allocated. Rank is earned by lifetime fees paid to that KOL while working for other projects — not for their own — or granted by a vote of their peers, whichever is higher.

The lifetime figure is summed from the splitter’s own allocation events, so it is a measurement rather than a claim: anybody can recompute it from public logs without asking us, and section 14 says how. It only ever rises — the registry refuses a lower total than the one it already holds — so a rank cannot be reduced by us being behind, only reached later.

The cap is a ceiling on one KOL in one window, not a budget: a creator may allocate anything from 1% up to it. An ineligible KOL reads a cap of zero, which is the same answer as “may not be allocated to”.

These thresholds and caps are settable by the platform owner. The values above are what the registry is deployed with. The contract is the authority at any moment — see section 14 for how to read the live table.

8. Who can be paid

A KOL must satisfy both of the following to be allocated to. Neither implies the other, and the same bar governs whether they may vote in a peer promotion.

• Eligible — enrolled on the platform with an X handle connected, and that handle carrying a live X Premium badge as of the last check. Premium and Verified Organizations both count; a legacy verification does not, because it is not a subscription and says nothing about whether an account is current. Platinum and Diamond are excused the subscription: a KOL who has earned that much for other projects has demonstrated the thing the subscription stands in for. The excused rank is settable and is Platinum as deployed.
• In good standing — attested recently enough to count as active. An attestation keeps an account active for a set window, 30 days as deployed, and the window is settable. An account nobody has attested inside it stops being payable until it is attested again.
• Not barred — the platform owner can withdraw an account’s KOL standing, and a barred account reads a cap of zero whatever its rank or badge. This is disclosed here rather than left to be discovered: it is the one input to your cap that is a decision rather than a measurement. What it does and does not affect, how it is recorded, and how it is reversed are in the terms of use.

An X subscription can be revoked at any time by X, which is why eligibility describes this instant rather than the day someone signed up. A badge is re-read daily and carried on chain within two hours of changing, so a lapse takes effect in about a day rather than immediately.

9. Checking before you sign

The allocation screen asks KolSplitter.allocationStatusOf — the same check the real transaction runs — about each line of a proposed allocation, in order, and shows exactly what the transaction would do with it: a status saying whether it would be accepted and why not, the wei it would become, and that KOL’s cap. These are free reads. They exist so a creator never learns that a KOL is ineligible from a failed transaction. A splitter deployed before 2 October 2026 answers the same question through its olderpreviewAllocation call.

It reports every line rather than stopping at the first problem, so one read gives the whole list of what needs fixing. Two things about it matter more than anything else on this page.

It is a snapshot. A KOL whose subscription lapses between the preview and the transaction is refused by the allocation regardless of what the preview said. The chain at the moment of the transaction is the authority, not the answer you read a minute earlier.

The lines are evaluated in order against a running total, and a refused line consumes none of it: the lines after it are judged against what would actually remain, not against a share a refused line never spent. A line can still be refused because the accepted lines above it used up the window.

10. How a KOL is paid

An allocation credits a balance; it does not send anything. A KOL withdraws it themselves, whenever they like, with claim() to their own address or claimTo(address) to another. There is no deadline and nothing expires.

Payment is pull rather than push on purpose: a KOL whose registered address cannot receive ETH fails only their own transaction, and can still recover the balance to an address that can.

11. The creator’s crew

A crew is a project’s founding group — the people tied to its founding — and it is a different relationship from a KOL, who is a promoter paid at the creator’s discretion out of the window described above. A crew is paid out of the creator’s own share, in every currency the launchpad pays, and it is not rank-gated in any way.

The creator is the residual claimant rather than a name on the roster, so they always keep at least 40% of their own share.

The 60% is a ceiling, not a target, and there is no minimum total. A creator may name no crew at all and keep 100%, or give one member the 10% minimum and keep 90%.

11.1 A creator can only ever be more generous, never less

A crew is not frozen at launch, but every change a creator can make gives rather than takes. Both of the following come strictly out of the creator’s own residual share, so no existing member loses a basis point to either and neither needs anybody’s consent.

• Appoint a new member, within the four seats and the 60% ceiling, at or above the 10% floor.
• Raise an existing member’s share.

There is no way to cut a share. No reduction, no revocation, no notice period, no owner override, no protocol path — those functions do not exist in the contract, for anybody, in any state. A power to cut is precisely what a founding share cannot have and still be a founding share: a creator who could reduce a founder once the work was done would hold an exit the founder never held.

11.2 A member leaves in one of two ways, and both are permanent

• They resign. Their own decision and nobody else’s — there is no privileged caller and no way back. No un-resigning, no creator override, no re-appointment at the same address.
• The crew removes them, unanimously. The creator and every other serving member must all vote for it, and at least one of those votes must not be the creator’s. A majority is never enough: a founding share is not something a faction should be able to take, so a removal only happens where there is no dispute left to have.

Opening a removal costs a fee; joining one is free. The first vote against a member carries a fee, fixed when the launch was created, which goes to the platform’s crew treasury in the same transaction. It is not refundable in any outcome, including one where the removal fails. Every later voter on the same member sends nothing.

A departure returns the share to the creator, not to the rest of the crew. The seat frees, the percentage goes back to the creator’s residual, and the creator may then choose to pass it on to somebody new. That choice is theirs and is not automatic — which is the difference between a share the creator gave and one the crew redistributed among itself.

Everything already credited stays the departing member’s. It sits in the splitter, claimable by them and only them, with no deadline and no forfeiture. They earned it while serving, and leaving does not take it. Income that has arrived but has not yet been distributed is a different thing: it has been credited to nobody, so it is split without them. Anybody can trigger that distribution, and a departing member should.

12. The protocol’s share, and THD

The protocol’s share passes the referral ledger first, so a referrer earns on it, and then reaches ProtocolFeeSplitter. That contract does two things: it routes each receipt, and it keeps the single running total the THD unlock is measured against.

The meter counts only registered payers. ETH arriving from anywhere else is not refused — refusing it would strand it — but it goes entirely to the treasury and never touches the counter. Nobody can accelerate a THD unlock by donating to it. The total is monotonic and has no setter, so nothing, including the owner, can lower it.

Of a counted receipt, half is routed to the liquidity contract that funds the THD pool, and half funds operations. The routing stops on its own once the liquidity contract’s target is reached, after which every later receipt goes wholly to the treasury.

Nothing is ever pushed at the THD contracts. The emission contract reads the fee total live and stores no figure of its own — there is no keeper reporting it and no trigger to press.

12.1 What the meter unlocks, and to whom

THD unlocks in proportion to the meter and splits across eleven fixed buckets. A bucket’s share is frozen when the token is deployed and cannot be moved afterwards, by anybody: a movable split would retroactively rewrite what everyone’s past activity had earned them.

Eleven since this revision; it was nine. LP providers and Settlers are new buckets, and Holders was renamed Spoils — it pays for turning up rather than for holding a balance, so the old name described something the bucket does not do. Every index after Creators moved, so a bucket number read off an older record names a different bucket here.

A share is a ceiling rather than a target. The KOL and referrer bucket pays its full 17% only if every ETH of protocol revenue came from promoted curve trading, which will not happen. What a bucket does not deliver is not kept by the platform — it goes to Spoils, which is why Spoils is larger in practice than the 11% beside it.

A quarter of three of these buckets is not paid to the earner. Traders, creators and market makers, and KOLs and referrers each take 75% of a day’s allocation into their own claim and direct the other 25% at a quest budget for bringing other people in — section 13.

12.2 The team’s share unlocks on valuation, not on a clock

The team bucket is 2%, and it is released in ten equal steps of 0.2% of total supply, one for each $10,000,000 of confirmed fully diluted valuation, complete at $100,000,000. Nothing at all is released by the passage of time.

A step is confirmed by a three-day window of pool samples whose minimum clears the threshold. A minimum rather than an average, because an average can be carried across a bar by a spike held for part of the window, while a minimum requires the price to be above it at every single sample. A confirmed step is permanent — a later fall in valuation does not re-lock it — and the step counter only ever moves upward. THD backing steps the platform never reaches can be burned, which lowers total supply rather than returning anything to the platform.

This replaces a 730-day vest, which is what the deployed token carries. Like the split above, it is built and not deployed.

13. Where else THD is spent, burned or paid

THD is not only something the platform pays out. Several surfaces take value in the other direction, and they do not all treat it the same way. The distinction that matters is in the last column: a protocol fee is revenue destined for the protocol treasury, it passes the fee splitter, it counts on the meter and it unlocks THD. Revenue destined for any other treasury is not a protocol fee and never counts. A burn is neither — it reaches no treasury at all.

Burned means the supply falls. Not sent to an address nobody holds the key to — destroyed, with the contract re-reading total supply afterwards and refusing to report a burn it cannot prove happened. Buying a premium pass is therefore not revenue reaching us: it is supply removed, which accrues to everybody holding THD including the people who did not buy one.

What a premium pass buys is bounded and is stated here so it is not inferred. It multiplies the points a holder earns by 1.25, and it buys a discount in the item mall. It does not buy a larger share of a season’s standings, it does not grant points, and it does not unlock any part of the milestone ladder. It is not a claim on platform revenue, and it is not refundable.

Quests are funded from rewards rather than from a payment. A user earning THD from trading, creating or promoting takes 75% into their own claim, and the other 25% becomes a budget they direct at bringing other people in. The platform never spends it and never chooses who receives it. Settlers, LP providers and Spoils are outside the split.

13.1 A monthly holder vote decides what happens to one fee

The THD/ETH pool charges a swap fee, and it arrives in two currencies. The ETH leg always goes to the THD pool treasury and nothing votes on it. The THD leg is decided by a vote, and the two outcomes are that it is burned, or that it is paid to the people providing liquidity in that pool. The platform is not one of the outcomes, and there is no third option a key could select.

Weight ramps over thirty days. Four samples are taken — at the snapshot and 7, 14 and 30 days before it — and averaged, so a position bought the day before a ballot carries a quarter of the weight of one held for a month. Wallet holdings are measured on chain; liquidity positions are measured from a published root, because a share of a concentrated-liquidity pool is not a figure the pool itself reports.

THD the platform holds does not vote. The unlock contract, the distributors, the vesting and claim contracts, the permanently locked pool position and every treasury are excluded, so the ballot is decided by THD belonging to somebody who could sell it.

14. Verifying any of this yourself

Every figure on this page is a value in a contract, and none of it has to be taken on trust. The contract addresses are published on this site, and the reads below answer the questions this document answers.

Some of those contracts are not deployed, which sections 2, 12 and 13 say where they start. The calls for those are listed anyway and are marked, so that what is being claimed is checkable as soon as there is an address to point at — and so that the absence of one is itself readable rather than something a reader has to infer from silence.

Where this page and the chain disagree, the chain is correct and this page is a bug — report it, and see the terms of use for what this document does and does not promise. The risk notice covers what these fees mean for anyone buying a token rather than launching one.

The Hood’s contracts are immutable, audited by Claude Fable 5. Nothing on this site is financial, investment, legal or tax advice.